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I. Introduction
Although both Germany and the United States have strong market-based
economies characterized by rigorous protection of private property rights, the two
countries have different conceptions of land ownership based on distinct notions of the
individual’s place in society. Whereas property protection under the U.S. Constitution
emphasizes individual freedom, German law explicitly considers the individual’s place in
and relationship to the social order in defining ownership rights. Indeed, in Germany,
where land is scarce and the rate of homeownership half that in the U.S.,1 private
preferences are often subordinated to a certain model of the normatively desirable
community by a comprehensive and hierarchical body of land-use regulation that favors
dense planning of city centers and mandates equivalent living conditions for all.
The contrast between our highly individualistic market-oriented conception of
property and that of the more community-centered German social welfare state is
reflected in the structure and judicial interpretation of the countries’ respective
constitutions.2 The property clause in the German Grundgesetz (The Basic Law, the
German constitution) contains an affirmative social obligation alongside its positive
guarantee of ownership rights. This social obligation is broad in scope, only to be limited
by ownership interests thought to implicate the fundamental values of human dignity and
self-realization. The U.S. Constitution, on the other hand, does not explicitly recognize
an affirmative social obligation of property use. At the same time, courts have not
considered property a fundamental right and are reluctant to use a language of natural
rights to describe ownership relations.3 Thus, in locating a limit on the social obligation
of ownership, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed rhetoric emphasizing the purely

1
Compare the national homeownership rate of 66% in the U.S. with the German rate of 33%. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, Historical Census of Housing Tables, last revised Dec. 2, 2004,
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/ownershipbyrace.html.; Douglas B. Diamond, Jr. and
Michael J. Lea, Housing Finance in Developed Countries: An International Comparison of Efficiency, 3 JOURNAL OF
HOUSING RESEARCH 79, 83 (1992). The average cost of land and construction in Germany is double or triple that in the
United States, and the down payment on a mortgage—between 30 and 50 percent—is also much larger. See, e.g., Hyde
Flippo, Home and Home, THE GERMAN WAY (1997).
2
See, e.g., Gregory Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 733, 739-40 (2003); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Planning and Land Development Law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 54 TUL. L. REV. 624, 655-6 (1980).
3
Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
1101, 1226 (1986).

3

economic impact of regulation rather than its effect on a property owner’s dignity or
autonomy, as in Germany.
While property owners’ non-economic interest may be recognized in less
formalistic ways under U.S. law—consider the differential treatment of residential and
commercial tenants or owner-occupancy carve-outs in just-cause eviction ordinances—
economic worth plays a more significant role in our property jurisprudence than in the
philosophical value-based approach of the German courts. The limit of the social
obligation (as imposed by government regulation) in German law is not necessarily
related to the economic impact any limitation on those rights may have, but rather
measured in terms of the extent to which rights left to the property owner post-regulation
serve the values or purposes for which property protection is granted by the State to
individuals (dignity and self-realization). In contrast, regardless of the purposes for
which property protection is granted in the U.S. (which, notably, are rarely articulated by
courts), the takings clause has been interpreted in courts, in large part, as a safeguard of
economic value and expectations related to realizing value in a property object.
Beginning with the assumption that both legal systems recognize a significant
social obligation (in the language of German court decisions) or expansive regulatory
power (in the language of U.S. courts), this note will compare how the scope of that
regulatory authority is circumscribed in the respective jurisdictions by the different
values protected by the respective property clauses. In depicting the German social
obligation, I will pay particular attention to the positive guarantee of property rights
codified in the German constitution, not only to illustrate this as a limit on the social
obligation, but also to show that German courts are comfortable with highly
individualized determinations into the personal meaning of property for property owners
(invoking what are referred to in Anglo-American jurisprudence as personhood interests)
and use such determinations to exclude purely economic interests4 from constitutional
protection. In considering these differences between U.S. and German constitutional
property regimes, I aim to address the question of what, if anything, the Fifth
Amendment positively guarantees for property owners.

4

Purely economic interests is used here to mean the right to make a profit beyond the threshold level necessary to
realize dignity and autonomy in the economic and social order.
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A.

The regulatory taking and socially responsible property use

The notion that there is a social obligation inherent in property ownership is not
controversial in American law. Even John Locke recognized that property could not be
justified as a social institution if some people were able to monopolize the ownership of
goods needed by all. Although the Lockean view is often cited by property rights
advocates as evidence of the fundamental primacy of property rights in the American
civic and legal tradition, Locke believed that individuals should be allowed property
sufficient for their needs only so long as there is sufficient land left for others.
All modern legal systems rely on institutional controls to monitor the behavior of
landowners, who might not otherwise consider the negative impacts of their property use
on neighboring property owners or on society in general. Usually, centralized
administrative or political bodies at the federal, state or local level use public land-use
controls to decide which development of private land may be carried out and which may
not.5 This regulation of property use often aims to strike a balance between the political
need for furtherance of the public welfare and stability of the legal order.6 The point of
equilibrium reached may be thought of as the social function of property in that legal
system, and how the judiciary and the legislature interact to express this function the
central concern of land-use regulation.7
Government compensation for property physically taken from the owner by
eminent domain (usually involving a transfer of title) is required by most property
regimes and generally uncontroversial when awarded by a court. However, jurisdictions
continue to face the question of whether and when extensive environmental or land-use
regulation can constitute a “taking” or infringement of property rights that requires the
government to pay compensation. The need for regulation—whether to prevent
incompatible development, to conserve natural resources or to protect historic
buildings—is generally recognized by a wide public. Much more contentious is the
question of who should pay for measures enacted in pursuit of any given public policy
5
There is also a parallel decentralized private law system that exploits owners’ self-interested monitoring activity over
neighboring land uses that negatively affect property values.
6
Ugo Mattei, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 31 (2000).
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goal, particularly when a regulation has considerable financial impact on the worth or
development potential of property. Assigning responsibility to the regulated owner is
often perceived as unfair. Thus, distinguishing non-compensable regulation from
compensable expropriation or “taking” of property often focuses on defining the scope of
the legislature’s power to define property rights by regulating use and on justifying such
restrictions on any given owner or use.
B.

The social obligation in U.S. and German constitutional property law

In U.S. law, nuisance doctrine has traditionally been one measure for allocating
the burden of socially responsible land use.8 A use of property that disturbs or harms
other landowners may be cast as blameworthy and its source identified in visible and
discrete parties or groups. However, the justification for governmental regulation of land
use becomes more contentious when the use regulated cannot be characterized as a
nuisance, in part because the U.S. Constitution does not contain any explicit limits on the
right to use property.
Under the German constitutional property clause, Article 14, a codified social
obligation (Sozialpflicht)9 has been interpreted to justify a greater range of land-use
regulation than the nuisance exception that has been such a central focus of U.S. takings
jurisprudence in U.S. law. As the second paragraph of Article 14, states, “Property
entails obligations. Its use should also serve the public interest.” The social obligation is,
both in theory and in practice, a generally-accepted and non-controversial part of German
property law in comparison to the analogous notion in U.S. Supreme Court takings
cases.10 Although municipalities in the U.S. have broad discretion to enact measures
7

Id.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992) (“[M]any of our prior opinions have
suggested that ‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the
requirement of compensation. . . The ‘harmful or noxious uses’ principle was the Court’s early attempt to describe in
theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation
without incurring an obligation to compensate—a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full
scope of the State’s police power.”).
9
Art. 14.2. Translation by AJ Van der Walt, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 121
(1999).
10
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City is representative of perhaps the
most enduring objection by plaintiffs bringing regulatory takings claims: “Of the over one million buildings and
structures in the city of New York, appellees have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks. . . . [T]he
landmark designation imposes upon [the owner] a substantial cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the
8
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under the police power for a broad range of purposes—far beyond what may be
characterized as a noxious or harmful use11—courts are unlikely to use language that
explicitly refers to the redistributive purpose of land-use regulation. The German State
under the Basic Law, on the other hand, is authorized to pursue a “socially just property
order” by balancing individual freedom against the interests of the general welfare and
courts regularly refer to this affirmative duty of the property owner and of the State.12
The property owner is thought to participate in the social order both by using her
property—seen as an expression of freedom and a means for development of
personhood—and by recognizing the social obligation as an important limit on the
exercise of these rights. The State is also thought to participate in this social order by
creating a property regime with the most favorable conditions for the greatest number of
people to acquire property and by demanding social responsibility from property owners
through land-use regulation.13
II.

A short introduction to U.S. takings law
Direct and indirect protections of property are scattered throughout the U.S.

Constitution—the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause and the 14th Amendment,
added in 1868 and interpreted to extend the Takings Clause to actions of state and local
governments. For the most part, the founding fathers considered property a natural right
underpinned by liberty.14 However, Takings Clause was not seen by the framers as a
central feature of the Constitution or Bill of Rights.15 Of the almost two hundred
constitutional amendments considered by the state ratifying conventions, none proposed a

honor of designation. The question in this case is whether the cost associated with the city of New York’s desire to
preserve a limited number of ‘landmarks’ within its borders must be borne by all of its taxpayers or whether it can
instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the individual properties.” 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
11
See, e.g., Lucas, 105 U.S. at 0123 (Referring to “[t]he transition from our early focus on control of ‘noxious’ uses to
our contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation”).
12
Manfred Weiss, Sozialbindung und soziale Gerechtigkeit, POLITISCHE STUDIEN, SONDERHEFT 1/2000, 23 (2000).
13
Id.
14
Robert Meltz, Dwight Merriam and Richard M. Frank, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE
CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 13 (1999).
15
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 782 (1995).
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takings clause.16 In fact, James Madison, author of the Bill of Rights, unilaterally
included it among the amendments he proposed in 1789.
Although no Congressional debate survives about its meaning, the language
eventually adopted,17 like the language of Madison’s initial proposal,18 was the language
of physical seizure. Thus, the Takings Clause may well have been intended to be limited
in scope to government confiscation of property for public roads and buildings and other
physically invasive uses.19 Few at the time imagined it would be invoked in suits by
landowners against the government for actions that merely involved restriction of
property use. In fact, it was not until the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon20 case
that the Court recognized for the first time that a mere restriction by the government, in
the absence of any physical occupation or appropriation of land, could trigger a Fifth
Amendment right to compensation if the regulation were so restrictive as to render an
owner’s remaining property rights virtually useless. In Pennsylvania Coal,21 Justice
Holmes reasoned that,
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law. . . [But] when it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if
not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.
By equating the substantial infringement of property use by regulation with the
appropriation of ownership through an exercise of eminent domain, Holmes determined
that there is a threshold beyond which compensation is required. However, this vision of
a constitutional check on the police power to regulate property remained relatively
theoretical for the next forty years. Challenges to land use regulations continued to be
made on due process, not takings, grounds,22 and the Court consistently gave great
deference to governmental restrictions unless they involved physical invasion or total

16

17

Id.

“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
“No person shall be...obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without just
compensation.”
19
Treanor, supra note 15.
20
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21
Id.
22
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
18
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destruction of property.23 This deference continued throughout the Warren and Burger
Court eras, as the Court declined over and over again to refine the parameters of when an
excessive regulation would go too far.
Finally, in the 1978 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City24 case, the
Court articulated a three-part test for determining when regulation becomes a taking. The
Court identified three factors to be applied in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries: 1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; 2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and 3) the character of the
government action.25 The next year the Court articulated a different two-part rule in
Agins v. City of Tiburon.26 In this case, the Court held that a regulation goes too far if
“the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.”27 Some commentators have tried to make
sense of these two different regulatory takings tests by arguing that the Penn Central test
is appropriate for as-applied challenges to regulations while the Agins test is appropriate
for facial challenges, but this distinction has not always been respected by the Court,28
which has in some cases applied the Agins test to as-applied challenges,29 and the Penn
Central test to facial challenges.30
Despite the uncertainty about when to apply which rule, the focus of regulatory
takings analysis since Penn Central has been on the quality of the government’s actions
and its impact on the landowner. The Court looks, on the one hand, at how restrictive,
how important, how narrowly tailored and how valuable the State’s interests are—at, in
other words, how the State justifies the regulation. At the same time, courts look to the
regulation’s effects on the landowner’s ability to use, enjoy, develop, and alienate her
property. This latter analysis focuses, in particular, on the economic impact on the
23

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
24
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25
Id. at 124.
26
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
27
Id. at 260.
28
See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1316 (1989) (outlining the four takings tests used by the Court—
Penn Central, Agins, the “no economically viable use” test, and the Loretto per se test—and concluding it is unclear
which test to apply in a given case).
29
See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.s. 687 (1999).
30
See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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landowner and the regulation’s interference with the landowner’s reasonable, investmentbacked expectations.
Forming the conceptual backdrop to this analysis is the bundle-of-sticks
metaphor, unique to Anglo-American law.31 Characterizing “property” as a “bundle of
sticks” or “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing,”32
the Supreme Court has recognized four essential kinds of property rights—possession,
use, exclusion of others, and disposal. Although the destruction of one “strand” in the
bundle is generally not considered a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety,33 Supreme Court jurisprudence has at times emphasized one “strand” above
others.34
For instance, the Court’s rule that permanent physical invasion of private property
by the government or by something authorized by the government (e.g. residential homes
destroyed by government-created floods35 or apartment building owners forced to provide
a place on their property for television and telephone cables36) is a per se taking has been
justified by the importance of the right-to-exclude “strand.”37 Since the right to exclude
others is one of the most revered incidents of ownership in the Court’s jurisprudence,
there can be no greater assault on private property rights than permanent physical
invasion by the government.38 These cases are not addressed by the Court with a set of
factors to be weighed and balanced in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion, but rather decided
on the basis of “per se” rules that focus on one particular aspect of the government’s
action.39
Although the Due Process Clause itself is rarely cited by the Supreme Court when
the issue is government restriction of a tract’s economic potential, the Court’s

31

German legal theory conceptualizes property as a unitary right as opposed to a bundle of entitlements.
Ruckselhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (quoting United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373,
377-78 (1945).
33
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
34
In Hodel v. Irving, for example, the Court dwelled on the right to devise.
35
Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or. 57, 843 P.2d 400 (1992) (where sewage-laden water, released from city
holding ponds onto private property, was considered a taking); Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah
1990) (city-authorized subdivision changing drainage and flooding property may be taking).
36
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) ([I]ntrusion of cable service onto rental
property is a taking. . . .”)
37
Meltz, supra note 14 at 117.
38
Meltz, supra note 14 at 117.
39
Meltz, supra note 14 at 9.
32

10

announcement in 1980 in Agins v. City of Tiburon of a new takings criterion40 based on
the degree of fit between the government’s means and ends heralded increased judicial
attention to due process concerns. In fact, the subsequent Nollan41 and Dolan42 cases
have required greater means-end scrutiny of land-use regulation than does due process
analysis.43 Nevertheless, this recent due process layer aside, takings law is largely
focused on the economic impact or the intrusiveness of government control—on the
results, rather than the means, of governmental regulation.44 Although courts have
repeatedly held that regulation foreclosing the most profitable use of property for an
owner or causing a substantial reduction in a property’s fair market value45 does not alone
constitute a taking,46 the Supreme Court did suggest in dicta in the 1992 Lucas decision,
that regulatory action that causes diminution in property values falling short of total
elimination of value might be compensable under the Takings Clause.47 Lower courts
have also held that non-total reductions in market value due to government regulation
may violate the Takings Clause.48
Between 1987 and 2000 the Court appeared to be moving toward greater
protection of property rights and greater scrutiny of governmental regulations. However,
most recently in 2002, the Penn Central test was reaffirmed as the most important takings
test in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.49 Most
importantly, the Court did not go further than Lucas had in developing what many
viewed to be its extreme property-protectionist position. Nevertheless, even if a resultsoriented look at takings cases suggests that other interests factor into the Court’s analysis,
the language employed by the Court in applying the Penn Central test remains focused
on the economic impact of a regulation on an owner.
40
A land use control, that case held, is a taking if it fails to “substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest.”
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
41
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
42
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
43
483 U.S. at 834 n.3
44
Meltz, supra note 14 at 132.
45
See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (zoning measure that causes 90% reduction of property value
not a taking); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (89% reduction not
taking).
46
See, e.g. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
47
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20, n.8.
48
See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 19 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (62% reduction in land value may
be a taking); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (99% reduction in land value plus
additional factors a taking); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (personal property’s value reduced
by 54% a taking).
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IV.

The U.S. social obligation
Although there is much tough talk about absolute property rights in American

public discourse, “the property-rights enthusiast on public radio probably does not even
have the right to burn dead leaves in his own back yard.”50 Indeed, many property
owners take for granted the many limits on ownership rights recognized in U.S. law—the
rights of neighbors, zoning law, environmental protection measures and other
administrative rules and regulations. Zoning first passed constitutional muster in 1926,51
and since the Supreme Court began to uphold the economic and labor legislation of the
Depression and New Deal period, “vigorous and direct constitutional protection of
entrepreneurial property rights” has steadily declined. Courts now employ a highly
deferential posture toward means as well as ends (in the rational basis test) and demand
only the vaguest sense of “public purpose” in reviewing legislation and regulatory
measures.52
Under the well-accepted nuisance exception, land-use regulation does not violate
the Fifth Amendment when “there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property
use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy”53
or, put another way, “when the government is preventing or punishing wrongdoing by
A.”54 Since the owner’s use of the property is seen as the source of the social problem,
“it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly.”55 However, courts have applied
this principle much more broadly than in traditional common-law analysis. As Justice
Kennedy wrote in the Lucas opinion,

49

535 U.S. 302 (2002).
Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 9 (1991).
51
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
52
The public purpose requirement is being reviewed in a pending Supreme Court decision, Kelo v. New London,
Connecticut. The Court’s public use inquiry could become more rigorous after that decision.
53
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988).
54
Andrea Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II -- Takings as Intentional
Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 53, 85 (1990).
55
485 U.S. at 20. In his dissent in this case about San Jose’s rent-control ordinance, Scalia used this reasoning to
question the validity of restrictions on rents in apartments occupied by poor tenants. He argued that because landlords
who rent apartments to poor tenants are no more to blame for their poverty than “the grocers who sell needy renters
their food, or the department stores that sell them their clothes, or the employers who pay them their wages,” the city
should not force them to subsidize poor tenants’ housing costs.
50
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The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives
in response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all
reasonable expectations whatever their source…. [N]uisance prevention
accords with the most common expectations of property owners who face
regulation, but I do not believe this can be the sole source of state
56
authority to impose severe restrictions.
As the scope of non-compensable land-use regulation has ballooned over time
through increased judicial deference to the legislature, holding the reins of police power,
there is still some discomfort in the jurisprudence about the justification for such a broad
interpretation of the police power to limit property rights in land. Scalia asserts in his
Lucas opinion that the harm-benefit rationale does not explain certain exercises of the
police power since “the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder”57 and the distinction between regulations
that “prevent harmful use” and those that “confer benefit” nearly impossible to discern on
an “objective, value-free basis.”58 Joseph Sax similarly observes that takings cases based
on nuisance law cannot be viewed as depending on judgments of blameworthiness but
rather often represent a conflict between “perfectly innocent and independently desirable
uses.”59
Noxious-use reasoning may be difficult to apply to regulation seen to impose
affirmative obligations on the property owner60—in the case of historic preservation, for
example.61 The most important case in this area is Penn Central, in which the
landmarked plaintiff, prevented from adding additional stories in high-rent and built-up
Manhattan, claimed that its property had been singled out to benefit others who bore no
burdens on its behalf. Because the neighboring property owners were able to reap the
economic benefits of building skyscrapers while the plaintiff, alone, had to shoulder the
preservation burden, the constitutional requirement of “average reciprocity of advantage”
56

505 U.S. at 1035.
505 U.S. at 1024; “It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the ecological, economic, and
esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina Legislature in the present case. One could say that imposing a
servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from ‘harming’ South Carolina's ecological
resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the ‘benefits’ of an ecological preserve.”
58
505 U.S. at 1026.
59
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 49-50 (1964).
60
As Peterson explains, the government must compensate A if it simply says, ‘We want your property because it would
promote the common good.’” Peterson, supra note 54 at 85.
61
“Under the historic preservation scheme adopted by New York, the property owner is under an affirmative duty to
preserve his property as a landmark at his own expense.” Rehnquist, dissenting in Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 140
57
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had not been met, the plaintiffs claimed.62 The Court accepted the legislature’s judgment
that “the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole,”63 contending
that “legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more
than others” and that the New York City law, in any case, also applied to over 400 other
landmarks in the city and all the structures in the 31 historic districts. A vigorous dissent
written by Justice Rehnquist, however, argued that the statute is fundamentally different
than most zoning measures, which are generally justified by the fact that all property
owners in a designated area are placed under the same restrictions—not just for the
benefit of the municipality as a whole but also for the common benefit of one another.
This reciprocity does not exist when “individual buildings . . . are singled out and treated
differently than surrounding buildings.”64 Moreover, the dissenters argued, the honor of
designation, the benefits of which would “accrue to all the citizens of New York City” do
not offset the multi-million dollar cost to the plaintiffs.65
In his Penn Central dissent Rehnquist points out the irony in the plaintiff being
“prevented from further developing its property… because too good a job was done in
designing and building it.” Even Sax—a proponent of a strong social obligation—admits
that there is a doctrinal contradiction. “In the ordinary case, obligation arises only
because the owner has done something undesirable,” but here the plaintiff was “worse off
than its neighbors,” not because anything in the proposed demolition itself or in the
increased density was prohibited, but rather because it had “designed and built an
especially fine building” and “now wished to withdraw the benefit that its presence had
conferred.”66 Further, Sax acknowledges, in agreement with Rehnquist, Penn Central
“departs from the conventional view of the rights and responsibilities of owners, and
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acknowledges a new sort of affirmative obligation.”67 The affirmative duty of the
property owner to preserve her property at her own expense is fundamentally different
from the usual negative duty (to refrain from doing harm) that has been the basis of many
zoning and land-use regulation decisions. As the courts sanction this affirmative duty
over and over again in historic preservation cases,68 they countenance “the law’s dirty
little secret,” Sax suggests.69 In other words, even while the preservation obligation
seems is a generally accepted public purpose, this restriction on property use remains
difficult to justify under the Supreme Court interpretation of the takings clause.
III.

Some basics of German constitutional property law
A.

The social state principle

In Germany, just as in the U.S., property under the Basic Law (the Grundgesetz)
is above all a right of exclusion against others and the State,70 as well as, in the tradition
of political liberalism,71 a recognition of individual freedom.72 However, Article 14 must
also be interpreted in the context of the German social state and the social history of the
Federal Republic.
The Basic Law states explicitly that Germany is a social welfare state.73 Adopted
right after World War II, the German constitution arose out of a unique set of historical
circumstances. The framers’ debates suggest that the political spectrum in Germany
directly after the war was considerably further left than it is today:
“The capitalist economic system has not served the vital governmental and
social interests of the German people well. Following the terrible
political, economic and social collapse as a result of a criminal political
67
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power, there can only be a new order from the ground up. The content
and goal of this social and economic new order can no longer be the
capitalist pursuit of profit and power, but rather only the prosperity of our
people.”74
Despite its foundation in neo-classical economics, Article 14 protection may be
distinguished from our liberalist tradition by the importance placed in the German
constitution on community obligation. Even the broad positive right to “development of
the personality” in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Grundgesetz75 is expressly limited by its
social context. In the words of the Federal Constitutional Court (the “FCC”), the court
that interprets the Basic Law, “While freedom and individual dignity are fundamentally
guaranteed, it cannot be overlooked that the image of man in the Grundgesetz is not that
of an individual in arbitrary isolation but of a person in the community, to which the
person is obligated in many ways.”76 As one commentator points out, since an individual
is considered to be “inextricably linked to the social order,”77 an individual’s “use of
space” must necessarily also be seen as “linked to the relationship of the individual to
society.”78
Thus, the Basic Law envisages broad public control over private property rights to
reconcile a property owner’s individual right to freedom with similar rights of the
individuals that make up society.79 Land-use planning begins at the federal level and
constitutes a much more comprehensive body of law80 than our own patchwork of
regulations. Under the Regional Planning Act, a federal law framing the broad outlines
of land-use policy and identifying the means of implementation, state-level planning is
mandatory. In contrast to the U.S., where a developer may evade the unfavorable zoning
plan of a municipality by relocating her building activities just outside the city limit, the
74

From the Ahlener Programm of the CDU (1947) (quoted in Christian Grimm, Landwirtschaftliches Eigentum und
Schutzgebietausweisungen—BRD, Institut für Wirtschaft, Politik und Recht, Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, July
2002, at www.boku.ac.at/wpr/wprpage.html). Translation by author.
75
“Each person has the right to free development of the personality, insofar as he does not violate the rights of others
and does not violate the constitutional order or moral law.”
76
4 BVerfGE 7.
77
Clifford Larsen, What Should Be the Leading Principles of Land Use Planning? A German Perspective, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 988 (1996).
78
Id.
79
Hanri Mostert, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF PROPERTY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE REFORM
OF PRIVATE LAW OWNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 39 (2002).
80
See the Regional Planning Act of 1997 (Raumordnungsgesetz), the Town and Country Planning Code of 1986
(Baugesetzbuch) and the various federal and provincial statutes on nature conservation (Naturschutzgesetze). See the
English translations of the Baugesetzbuch and the Raumordnungsgesetz at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/.

16

Länder (states) determines the pace and location of virtually all development, since
nearly all German land lies within the territory of a municipality.81
Such an expansive and hierarchical system reflects not only the fact that Germans
have many fewer acres on which to sprawl out than we do, but also the different cultural
values that have developed regarding property ownership in the two nations. 82 In
contrast to the American view of land-use regulation as a means of restricting private
property rights, German urban planning assumes that such government regulation is an
important way of maintaining the social order. Land-use regulations have been used to
promote policy objectives such as “stabilization of small cities’ populations by
preventing large-scale migration for economic reasons; the prevention of sprawl and the
preservation of the appearance of both cities and countryside; and the promotion of
commercial agriculture and especially family farmers.”83 Unlike German regulations,
which “place the individual in the center of a managed landscape and a restrictive
community,” American land-use regulation seems to reject this idea of a socially-situated
self.”84 Late 19th century suburbanization in the U.S. marked an important change in the
relationship of the individual to society with regard to residential patterns. “The new
ideal was no longer to be part of a close community, but to have a self-contained unit, a
private wonderland walled off from the rest of the world.”85 Thus, as one writer argues,
the normative form of the American community has become the “private, rustic life,” in
which the city is not considered a necessary part of the social order and land-use controls
have been “organized around a kind of flight: a flight into privacy and independence
captured by the detached suburban house.”86 Our cultural norms of property ownership
embrace a liberal individualism in which a landowner’s interests and desires often exist
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outside of a communal setting and an aggressive property rights rhetoric is rarely
tempered by talk of duties and obligations as a responsible community members.87
B.

A brief history of the German constitution

The German constitution is called the “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz), not the
“constitution.” This designation expresses the expectation at the time of its promulgation
in 1949 that the division of Germany by the Allied forces after the Second World War
would be only a temporary measure and that a permanent constitution for the whole
country would be written later.88
Negative historical experience played a major role in shaping the constitution.
The framers, determined to prevent anything similar to National Socialism from
happening again, sought to create safeguards against the emergence of either an overly
fragmented, multiparty democracy, similar to the Weimar Republic (1918-33), or
authoritarian institutions characteristic of the Nazi dictatorship of the Third Reich (193345). Most strikingly, the German constitution grants primary importance to human
dignity. The first two sentences of the Grundgesetz after the preamble read: “Human
dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.”
The bill of rights (Grundrechtskatalog) makes up the first part of the Basic Law.
Articles 1 through 19 delineate basic rights that apply to all German citizens, including
equality before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, the news media, and worship;
freedom from discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or political beliefs; and the
right to conscientious objection to compulsory military service. Article 20 provides that
“the Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.” Althouth the
word “social” has been commonly interpreted to mean that the state has the responsibility
to provide for the basic social welfare of its citizens, the Basic Law does not enumerate
specific social duties of the state.
Fundamental disputes about the formulation of the economic order and the
property clause, particularly the social obligation, almost held up ratification of the Basic
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Law.89 Although most political parties in Germany between 1945 and 1949, including
the SPD (Social Democratic Party), the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the KPD
(Communist Party of Germany), were in favor of a break with the property order of the
past and socialization, the Western Allied Powers promoted an economy based on private
ownership of the means of production and by the time the Grundgesetz was drafted in
1949, the more conservative CDU under Chancellor Adenauer opted for a liberal marketbased economy.90 The result of the controversy is that the Basic Law is virtually silent
on economic matters, with the exception of Article 14, which guarantees “property and
the right of inheritance” and provides that “expropriation shall be permitted only in the
public weal.”
B.

Property protection in the Basic Law

Article 14 consists of the three clauses:
1. (i) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. (ii) Their
substance and limits shall be determined by law.
2. (i) Property entails obligations. (ii) Its use should also serve the public
interest.
3. (i) Expropriation shall only be possible in the public interest. (ii) It may only
be ordered by or pursuant to a law which determines the nature and extent of
compensation. (iii) Compensation shall reflect a fair balance between the
public interest and the interests of those affected. (iv) In case of dispute
regarding the amount of compensation recourse may be had to the ordinary
courts.91
For purposes of the discussion below, 14.1.i will be referred to as the guarantee
clause; 14.1.ii read with 14.2 as the regulation clause; and 14.3 as the expropriation
clause. 14.1.i constitutes a positive guarantee of property. This is a guarantee that both
the property itself—including, to some extent, its value—as well as the legal entity of
89
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ownership will be protected in the hands of its owners. 14.2 constitutes a direct social
obligation of property owners while 14.1.ii mandates the legislature to define property
rights so as to take this obligation into account. The expropriation clause is analogous to
our takings clause, imposing a public purpose requirement and duty of compensation on
the legislature. An important difference, though, is that it specifies that compensation
may only be provided if provided for by a statute.
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, which rarely mentions the purpose of
assigning property rights to owners,92 the fundamental purpose of the property guarantee
is set out at the beginning of almost every important decision.93 In this relatively
consistent statement, Article 14 represents a tension between the liberal view of private
property (individual property rights justified by natural law) and the social function of
property (property rights created and restricted by social context).94 The property
guarantee is, as summarized by one comparative law scholar,“(a) a fundamental human
right, (b) which is meant to secure, for the holder of property, (c) an area of personal
liberty (d) in the patrimonial sphere, (e) to enable her to take responsibility for the free
development and organization of her own life (f) within the larger social and legal
context.”95 While elements (a)-(e) emphasize the importance placed on personhood
(Freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit or free development of personhood), especially in
the economic sphere, (f) indicates that the content of this guarantee must be defined
through legislation that takes account of the social obligation.96
One the one hand, property in the German constitution is associated with
guarantees to liberty and personhood. For holders of property rights, Article 14
guarantees freedom in the “patrimonial sphere,” enabling holders of property rights to
live independently and to freely take responsibility for their own lives. In this sense,
private property is considered both an expression and a prerequisite of the individual
freedom protected as a fundamental right in the second Article97 of the Basic Law. In the
words of the Federal Supreme Court, the individual, integrated into the Community of the
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State, needs a strictly safeguarded sphere of property in order to be able to live as a
person among equals.98 Thus, the function of the property guarantee in German
constitutional theory is to permit the holder of a protected property interest to act freely
with the property to control her own economic destiny.99
As (f) suggests, however, the property guarantee is not absolute. The social
obligation binds the legislator in determining the contents and limits of ownership rights,
and the owner, in exercising her rights, to take into consideration the interests of nonowners affected by the exercise of those rights. On the one hand, legislative protection of
this interest enables the individual to act upon his or her own initiative and to take
responsibility for his or her actions, while participating in the development and
functioning of the broader social and economic community.100 Thus, securing individual
freedom in the constitution is thought to secure a broader social system made up of and
dependent on the individual freedom of society’s participants. At the same time, though,
the social obligation in the property clause provides protection for the autonomy and
personhood of non-property owners from the impacts of owners’ exercise of property
rights.101
Therefore, since the purpose of the property guarantee is to secure one’s existence
by assuring economic and social autonomy, property is constitutionally guaranteed to the
extent that it fulfills this “existence-securing”102 function and only to the extent that it
fulfills this function. Beyond this, rights may be up for grabs by the legislature as part of
a property owner’s social obligation. That is, the Sozialpflicht will be concretized by the
legislature in the form of limitations on ownership.
1.

The guarantee clause

In interpreting the Grundgesetz German courts distinguish between fundamental
or subjective rights accruing to the individual and institutional guarantees prescribing the
fundamental values of the existing social and legal order.103 The Grundrechte have
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elements of both. Thus, the property guarantee is understood as comprising two separate
but related guarantees: a substantive material or individual guarantee (Bestandsgarantie)
and an institutional guarantee (Institutionsgarantie).
The individual guarantee (Bestandsgarantie), usually associated with the classic
liberal view of property, protects the individual property holder and her concrete property
holdings against specific state interferences. This is a negative guarantee in the sense that
the state may only regulate or expropriate away individual property rights, in accordance
with legal requirements and for public purposes that are considered more important than
the individual property guarantee.104 In addition to general liberty interests, the
Bestandsgarantie also protects personhood as a realm for the development of personal
autonomy and self-reliance.
The institutional guarantee, on the other hand, recognizes private property in an
objective sense as a basic component of a specific economic and ideological model of
state organization that the State is obliged to preserve and foster affirmatively.105 The
purpose of this guarantee is to prevent the state from reducing the potential sphere of
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 14 by eroding or abolishing the existence,
availability and usefulness of property for individuals.106 In contrast to the individual
guarantee, which protects an individual property holder against the expropriation of a
specific piece of land, a water use right, or a mineral right, the institutional guarantee
prevents the state from eliminating or removing whole categories of property such as
land, or water, or minerals in general.
2.

The regulation clause

The same clause that positively guarantees property also serves as a mandate to
the legislature to limit those rights: “Property and the right of inheritance shall be
guaranteed. Their substance and limits shall be determined by law.”107 The fact that
these two sentences stand together in a clause of Article 14 has been called the “cardinal
problem” of German property law.108 Based on 14.1, the FCC has developed an
104
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extensive jurisprudence on certain aspects of property that cannot be changed by the
legislature. At the same time, 14.1.ii represents a legislative mandate to regulate. As will
become clear from the discussion below, the FCC has interpreted this first sentence to
constrain the operation of the second, which then defines the scope of the social
obligation.
3.

The constitutional definition of property

The uniquely constitutional notion of property came about in two of the most
significant developments in German constitutional property history—the 1981
Nassauskiesung (gravel mining) decision and the Pflichtexemplar (obligatory sample)
decision handed down the day before. Before these landmark cases, a property owner
plaintiff had to elect between two options: she could petition the administrative courts to
invalidate an unconstitutionally harsh measure, or she could acquiesce to application of
the measure and seek compensation through inverse condemnation (enteignender
Eingriff), applied directly on the basis of 14.3 by the civil courts.109
In the Gravel Mining decision, though, the FCC made a sharp distinction between
14.1-2 regulation of property, which is not to be compensated, and 14.3 expropriation,
which is compensable. This case involved a landowner’s challenge to a provision of the
Water Supply Law (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz) that required anyone wishing to use surface
or groundwater to obtain a permit. The law had been passed to address the widespread
groundwater contamination that resulted from extensive mining of gravel during the
period of post-World War II reconstruction. The plaintiff, who had been taking the water
for decades as owner and operator of a gravel pit, was denied a permit to use the water
beneath his land. The city cited potential despoliation of the public water supply in its
denial. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the denial of a permit to continue
gravel extraction below the groundwater constituted a taking of his rights in his ongoing
business and in his real property.
Although the Court acknowledged that this regulation constituted interference
with both the Bestandsgarantie (since the property owner had been guaranteed use of this
groundwater without permission until the passage of the Water Supply Law) and the
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Institutsgarantie (since free development and use of property was not possible without
governmental permission), these protections must give way in the case of vital public
resources, which occasionally must be entrusted by statute not to the private property
owner but to the public at large.110 Thus, if an owner enjoys no right in the groundwater
under his property, he has no right that can be taken from him and the court accordingly
held this provision to be a property content regulation under 14.1.ii, not a taking under
Article 14.3. Subsequent to this opinion, expropriation refers only to the physical
confiscation of property and compensation is only available on the basis of 14.3. In other
words, there is no longer an equivalent for the U.S. regulatory taking.
If the legislation had constituted a taking, the provision would only have
withstood constitutional challenge if the law regulated the type and amount of
compensation (Art und Ausmass der Entschädigung), as required by 14.III.ii. 111 If no
such regulation existed, then the law would be unconstitutional and any administrative
action pursuant to it would be invalid. 112 The result of the court’s holding in the Gravel
Mining Case is that an owner has no constitutional claim for compensation absent a law
that provides for compensation (because the civil courts do not have jurisdiction to
invalidate the overly harsh administrative action, the other plausible remedy in this
situation), and must petition the administrative courts to invalidate the overly harsh
administrative action.
5.

Property content regulation requiring reimbursement
(ausgleichpflichtige Inhaltsbestimmung)

After the Gravel Mining decision, the regulation or definition of property rights
by the legislature (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung) does not, in principle, require
payment of compensation. (In fact, as explained above, the owner may no longer elect
between invalidation and compensation.) However, one day before the Gravel Mining
case, the FCC decided in its Mandatory Sample decision that some regulations would
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only be constitutional if they provided for measures to mitigate excessive burdens on the
property owner. 113
The law at issue obliged all publishers to provide, at no cost, one copy of each of
their publications to the central state library so that all new publications would be
available and preserved in one place. A publisher of high-quality art books printed in
small editions objected, claiming that the regulation disproportionately affected him and
therefore violated the equality principle (Gleichheitsatz). Although the FCC concluded
that the law was not an expropriation, but rather a content regulation,114 the Court
declared the regulation unconstitutional as applied to this publisher because, when
applied to small issues of expensive volumes, the law overstepped the bounds of a
reasonable content regulation and violated the equal protection element of 14.I.ii.115
The court called this new legal institution a “content regulation requiring
equalization” (ausgleichspflichtige Inhaltsbestimmung).116 The so-called
Ausgleichanspruch (claim for an equalization payment) is something different than the
claim for compensation pursuant to Article 14.III expropriation, however. First of all,
because the level of a monetary Ausgleichzahlung (equalization payment) is determined
not by the economic value of the property use or object, but rather by a balancing test that
weighs private use against the general good, the property owner generally receives
significantly less than she would in the case of compensation for an expropriation. In
fact, as will be discussed in more detail below, the FCC has held that this mitigation must
not necessarily be monetary and that money is actually only a last resort for other
equalization measures (such as variances, grandfathering clauses or phase-in periods).
Second, the “content regulation requiring equalization” is derived from 14.1.ii. In other
words, after the Mandatory Sample case, restriction on the use of property resulting from
14.1.ii legislation must still, with one exception, be suffered without compensation. The
exception is when an otherwise constitutional enactment causes unreasonable hardship in
113
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its application. The equalization payment is thought to discharge violations of the
reasonableness principle and the constitutional guarantee of property that would
otherwise result.117
Just like compensation for a 14.III expropriation, though, a property owner only
has claim to Ausgleich (equalization) if the payment or softening measure is provided for
in legislation. The property holder may, however, attack the validity of a regulatory
measure that does not provide for this “equalization,” and the law will be declared void if
the court determines that it does, indeed, constitute a disproportionate burden without
provision of the compensation or “equalization” described above.
D.

The German judicial system

The judicial system in Germany represents a compromise between state (Land)
independence in judicial matters and the desire for legal unity.118 There are state-level
civil courts in every Land as well as more specialized federal courts scattered throughout
the country to ensure that the law is interpreted uniformly.119 Divided into different
fields of jurisdiction, the highest federal courts include: the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter “FSC,” the highest federal court in civil matters), the
Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), the Federal Labor Court,
(Bundesarbeitsgericht), the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht), and the Federal
Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof).120
In the field of property law, jurisdiction is divided between administrative courts
(where the Federal Administrative Court is the court of final instance) and what are
referred to as “ordinary courts” (where the FSC is the final instance). While the
administrative courts have jurisdiction over review of administrative decisions and
actions pertaining to expropriation, ordinary courts have jurisdiction with regard to
compensation that must be paid for expropriations (i.e., in the case that the amount of
compensation is contested). Because these issues are interrelated, both courts have been
117
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forced to interpret 14.2.ii’s public welfare provision and to consider when compensation
must be paid, and therefore effectively share jurisdiction in setting the standards
according to which public and private interests in property regulation are balanced.121
In addition to these two courts, there is the FCC, which has the function of
protecting, interpreting and applying the Basic Law.122 This court does not function as
another higher instance of other branches of the judiciary but rather only has jurisdiction
on questions about whether legislation, actions of the state or court decisions are in
accordance with the Basic Law. The FCC has also developed its own interpretation of
the property clause, which does not always coincide with either that of the FSC or the
Federal Administrative Court. Although shared jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the
property clause has led to three different interpretations of Article 14, the FCC is usually
considered to be the most persuasive authority and its decisions will be the focus of this
paper.123
VII.

The positive property guarantee in the Grundgesetz
The U.S. Constitution does not “create” or guarantee property rights. Rather, the

takings clause and due process protect infringement of such rights created by other laws.
In contrast to this negative property guarantee, which is also found in many other
constitutions,124 Article 14 of the Grundgesetz contains a positive guarantee of private
property as 1) an institution (Institutsgarantie) as well as 2) a subjective right of the
individual to a certain constitutionally-protected Bestand (“condition”) of property.
Although this is not an absolute right—ownership is subject to a social obligation, also
spelled out in the Basic Law in a clause that permits considerable regulation—its status in
the Grundgesetz is that of a fundamental right125 with an identity independent of ordinary
laws.126 In other words, separate from the “property” defined by individual rights created
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in civil law is the constitutional property concept developed by the FCC. As became
clear in the Gravel Mining decision discussed above, this constitutional property is much
broader than private law ownership.127 Such an approach enables the courts to interpret
the meaning of property so as to give more weight either to social justice or to individual
freedom, depending on the demands of society at a given moment.128
Even more unusual than the existence of this positive guarantee is the extensive
theory that has been developed in German law to explain the separate meaning of this
phrase.129 Just as in the U.S., the German FCC has examined environmental protection
regulation, historic preservation measures, building moratoria, redevelopment schemes
and rent control. Yet, instead of asking, as do U.S. courts, whether a regulation has gone
“too far,”130 German decisions have focused on which rights of ownership must be left
over after legislative definition—what the legislature cannot regulate away. This focus
on the constitutionally-guaranteed sphere of rights (the Kernbereich or “core field”)
existing independently of positive law is also important to circumscribing the
Sozialpflicht because property owners may only be called upon to sacrifice property use
for the public welfare insofar as this Kernbereich is not infringed.131
Although property rights may be enjoying an ascendancy of sorts in the U.S., they
still have not yet taken a place alongside non-economic civil liberties (such as freedom of
speech, association or religion) in the degree of judicial scrutiny and distrust of
government that courts deem appropriate.132 Indeed, property is not recognized as a
fundamental right in U.S. jurisprudence in contrast to Germany, where economic
independence is understood to be essential to every other freedom. 133 In contrast to
liberty interests or the right to make autonomous decisions about highly personal matters,
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such as abortion,134 childrearing,135 or life-sustaining medical procedures,136 all of which
courts consider fundamental and uphold encroachment on only for “compelling”
governmental objectives, property rights cannot resist any measure that passes a weak
“rationality” standard under substantive due process theories.137 In fact, no modern
Supreme Court decision has recognized a property right as fundamental for substantive
due process purposes. Although property rights have gained greater protection under the
takings clause over time,138 “the decisions hailed by property rights partisans and
property owners as paradigm-shifting victories—First English, Lucas, Nollan and
Dolan—remain “doctrinally cautious and often limited in application.”139 Moreover, the
Supreme Court rarely finds regulatory taking based on land-use restrictions in the
absence of either physical invasion or total deprivation of economic use.140
In a country widely regarded as fiercely protective of property rights, why is
property not positively guaranteed in the Constitution and why is the right to private
property not considered a fundamental right? Given that classical legal philosophy and
political theory advocated private property rights zealously,141 attributing to ownership
the same sacrosanct status as rights to life and liberty, it might be argued that this
generally shared belief made it unnecessary for a Constitution based on the possessive
individualism of 18th century revolutionary declarations to grant specific protection to
property beyond the takings clause.142 Since the government proposed by the
Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers, the general right of property
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation. . . .” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392
(1994).
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ownership may have not been specifically protected because the Framers preferred to
avoid confining freedom to stated rights which could never comprehend the whole of
liberties.143
Another possible reason, however, that there is no “fundamental right” to property
protection in our constitution is that property under U.S. law is largely viewed as an
artificial creation of law and not a human right created by the constitution itself, as in
Germany.144 As the Supreme Court made clear in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v.
Beckwith, property rights are “created and their dimensions defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”145
A.

Article 14 in the Grundgesetz: More than a worth guarantee

Unlike the Fifth Amendment’s negative guarantee, the Article 14 positive
guarantee is not limited to providing monetary compensation for a “taking” of property
rights.146 The fact that part of a property Bestand is inviolable reflects the fact that
property is not considered fungible as a guarantee of economic value in the German
constitution, but rather regarded as a human right.147 The FCC has distinguished the
Basic Law’s Article 14 from Article 143 of the earlier Weimar Constitution (which
guaranteed the economic value of property) to illustrate the fundamental difference
between a negative and positive property clause: “The function of Article 14 is not
primarily to prevent the taking of property without compensation… but rather to secure
existing property in the hands of its owners.” Although Article 14’s positive formulation
may include a guarantee of property’s value in the sense that compensated expropriation
142
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or mitigated regulation may be acceptable in some cases, “this view does not reflect the
[full] purpose and spirit of Article 14.” As opposed to the Weimar Constitution, where
“the judiciary had to be concerned primarily with protecting property owners through
compensation,”148 and where therefore “the basic right [of property] emerged more and
more into a demand for adequate compensation,” Article 14’s property guarantee must be
seen in relationship to the purpose of property protection—to secure a realm of freedom
within which persons engage in self-defining activity and control their own destinies.
Thus, Article 14 serves the property owner as a defensive or negative right or
shield from state intervention, in the tradition of political liberalism in which the U.S.
takings clause is also grounded.149 Yet the property right under the Grundgesetz is not
primarily a material guarantee, but a personal one.150 In contrast to the neoclassical role
of property protection as an economic entitlement,151 the German scheme of
constitutional property reflects a republican ideal of moral and civic duty that is largely
absent from classical economic liberalism.152
As the legislature continues to update the constitutional conception of property to
take account of a property object’s social context, it is obligated to uphold both the
subjective and the institutional property guarantees. Accordingly, the FCC has developed
a sophisticated jurisprudence on what cannot be defined away by the judicially
interpreted constitutional concept of property. Most important here is the notion of
Privatnutzigkeit (private use), referring to what the Court considers the defining
characteristic of positively guaranteed property (and, therefore, the absolute limit on state
regulation). Property no longer “deserves” the name “property,” the Court has said, when
an owner can no longer derive any valuable use out of it. While private use may, of
course, be restricted by the social obligation, the social obligation may only limit the
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individual’s freedom to use property to the extent that she still has private use for the
object of property protection.
B.

What does the 5th Amendment guarantee?
1.

Is this a worth guarantee?

Under what Gregory Alexander terms the “property as commodity” view
prevalent in the U.S.,153 the core—though not the only—purpose of property as a
constitutional value is individual preference satisfaction. In other words, property serves
to define in material terms the legal and political sphere within which individuals are free
to pursue their own private agendas, free from governmental coercion, and in this sense
the 5th Amendment property clause serves as a basic right used to block “legislative or
regulatory redistributive measures that frustrate the full satisfaction of individual
preferences.”154
In a constitutional property jurisprudence that increasingly develops in the context
of takings, rather than substantive due process, challenges,155 the worth of property is
protected. “Property interests that would receive minimal protection under German
constitutional law because they do not immediately implicate the fundamental values of
human dignity and self-realization receive increasingly strong protection under American
constitutional law,” according to Alexander. “Land held for the sole purpose of market
speculation is as apt under the U.S. Constitution, perhaps more apt, to receive strong
protection as is a tenant’s interest in remaining in her home.”156 Indeed, there are few, if
any, instances where the Court has explicitly accorded greater protection to a property
right implicating personhood interests than one involving a purely speculative
investment.
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Moreover, the Court has rarely, if at all, expressed skepticism for the importance
of protecting property uses that are pure profit-making or speculation. Scalia’s dissent in
Palazzolo even seems to affirm the equal treatment of such interests in takings
jurisprudence: “This is not much different from the windfalls that occur every day at
stock exchanges or antique auctions, where the knowledgeable (or the venturesome)
profit at the expense of the ignorant (or the risk averse).”157 As one scholar notes, the
Supreme Court seems to view “taking a dollar from a homeless person [as] functionally
equivalent to taking a dollar from a millionaire,”158 reflecting a general reticence to
conduct an individualized analysis of the property owner’s dependence on or relationship
to the object of protection.159
Indeed, an owner’s interest in property and the impact of government regulation
are often defined in terms of economic value in U.S. law, in contrast to the German
courts’ rhetoric of dignity and autonomy. As first established in Penn Central, which
remains the Court’s “polestar,”160 the Court’s test for both deprivations of all value and
partial regulatory takings has remained focused on the economic impact of government
regulation in relation to the purpose furthered161 and on whether the deprivation is
contrary to reasonable investment-backed expectations.162 “[T]he Takings Clause…
protects private expectations,” according to Justice Kennedy, “to ensure private
investment.”163
2.

A purely constitutional notion of property in U.S. law

Though economic worth is a defining characteristic of constitutionally-protected
property rights, the Supreme Court has never settled on an essential “stick” from the
“bundle” or quantum of property rights that is unconditionally guaranteed by the
Constitution. What courts and commentators do often agree on, however, is that the
power to regulate is not boundless. It is hard to imagine a state purpose so compelling
157
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that “any competing use must yield,” Scalia wrote in his Lucas opinion.164 In Palazzolo
Kennedy similarly suggests that there must be some limit to the State’s authority to shape
and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, even when the
property owner takes title with notice of the regulation.165
Otherwise, there is an “inherent circularity” to a definition of property set by the
legislature. “If the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a
proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what the courts say
it is.”166 Thus, a limit on the police power to redefine these expectations—a positive
guarantee backed by constitutional norms—must be read into the U.S. property clause if
the 5th Amendment is to have meaning at all.167
It is interesting then, as a comparative note, that FCC jurisprudence first
mentioned an exclusively constitutional notion of property as justification for expanding
the scope of public control over land use. In the watershed Gravel Mining decision168
mentioned above, the Court departed from its own previous view that property must be
considered in light of its historical development under the Civil Code and held that the
constitutional notion of property was derived from neither ordinary statutes nor private
law regulations, but rather from the constitution’s private guarantee itself. What was
most novel about the Gravel Mining decision is that the Court explicitly recognized that
the constitutional concept of property realizes a particular social model. Although the
legislature might carry out the task of defining property in terms of particular rights or
duties, the Constitutional Court, in interpreting the constitutional notion of property at
any moment in time, determines the balance between this content and its limitations,
between the fundamental protection of private property and the social obligation to use
that property with regard for the greater welfare.
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V.

Comparing the U.S. social obligation with the German Sozialpflicht
A.

Germany’s Sozialpflicht

The regulation clause,14.1.ii, is interpreted by courts as a directive to the
legislature to carry out 14.2’s mandate: to foster a property regime in which the
conditions are favorable for all to acquire property and where those property rights
incorporate, in the form of limitations imposed by the legislature, the externalities they
create for non-owners and society at large. The extent to which the legislature may
regulate these ownership rights corresponds to the social function served by the object of
those rights, as measured by the property’s importance for fulfilling the self-development
and self realization purposes of constitutional property protection.
The tone of the property rights discourse forming a backdrop to the social
obligation imposed on the legislature and property owners is not nearly as shrill as ours.
In fact, there is a remarkable “absence of major debate in Germany about the need for
…an elaborate system of land use planning.”169 This is not, however, a function of “lack
of attention to land use issues,” but rather the fact “that German land use planning
experts—particularly those who are geographers or planners, rather than lawyers—seem
to presume that a state inherently has the power and obligation to engage in extensive
land use planning.”170
As will be explored in greater depth below, the social obligation in Germany is
broader in scope than any analog in U.S. law. Just as in the U.S., the ownership of
property in Germany does not include the right to cause a public nuisance.171
Uncontroversial regulations include, for example, the right to prevent mining companies
from depleting groundwater supplies172 or to destroy dogs suspected of having rabies.173
Although the Sozialpflicht naturally encompasses the legislature’s duty to prohibit any
169
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noxious property use, 14.1.ii has neither been limited to prevention of nuisance in its
interpretation by courts nor tied to the harm-prevention concept so important in U.S. law.
Courts do not even stretch to characterize most enactments of the Sozialpflicht as
prevention of a nuisance. Indeed, in its perception of ownership as socially tied, the
social obligation clause is much “broader than the minimal duty to avoid creating a public
nuisance,” and therefore looks different than the takings clause in the American
constitution.174
In general, the Sozialbindung refers to the justification for all limitations on
property imposed by sovereign acts of the state that do not lead to compensation for
expropriation. This includes all constitutional laws, regulations and measures enacted
under Article 14.2 that do not satisfy either of two criteria. Such legislative definitions of
property must not: 1) constitute Güterbeschaffung (a physical confiscation of
property),175 an essential criterion for the Court’s most recent enger Enteignungsbegriff
(narrow expropriation term), or 2) belong to the “certain aspects of property which cannot
be changed by the legislature” (the positively guaranteed Kernbereich). In other words,
the State may regulate private property rights as an exercise of the social obligation so
long as the act neither constitutes a “taking” nor infringes the constitutionally-defined set
of core property rights (the Kernbereich).
An Article 14 expropriation is narrower than the U.S. Fifth Amendment, under
which a land-use control in some cases may be characterized as a compensable regulatory
taking. A land-use regulation under German law is not identified as an expropriation on
the basis of its intensity, scope or unequally distributed burden,176 but rather distinguished
formalistically by its form and purpose. Property must be physically removed from its
owner (Güterbeschaffung) and the measure specifically intended to limit property rights
(rather than the inadvertent consequence of an illegal or negligent state act) for it to
constitute an expropriation. In the case that a measure does not fulfill either of these
requirements, it cannot be an expropriation, no matter how intense the impact on the
owner is. Even in the absence of an expropriation, the Court may decide that a regulation
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eliminates an owner’s right to exert dominion over her property or her private use of the
property—that it infringes the Kernbereich, in other words. This latter category of
regulations are not considered expropriations, though, and the plaintiff is only entitled to
injunctive relief. In these cases, the State may not engage in such regulation, even if it
pays.
Therefore, the regulatory taking does not exist in German law and any limitation
of property rights that does not fall under one of the narrow categories described above177
may, in principle, be an expression of the social commitment of property.178 This does
not mean, however, that the property owner must withstand any measure enacted under
the contents and limitations clause without any sort of compensation. Individual property
owners may bring facial challenges to measures enacted by the legislature, arguing that a
particular law does not take into account landowners who are disproportionately
burdened by its provisions by providing compensatory measures, Ausgleichsleistungen
(the equalization payments described above). A claim that a particular landowner was
entitled, but not awarded, compensatory measures for which a specific law provides may
also be brought.
1.

The direct obligation

The social obligation, in the second clause of Article 14, is interpreted as a direct
mandate for property owners and the legislature.179 This encompasses not only a duty to
refrain from socially unjust uses (Unterlassen sozialwidriger Eigentumsnutzungen), but
also an affirmative duty to engage in socially just uses (sozialgerechte Nutzungen). In
other words, without any further legislation or interpretation by the legislator, selfexecuting limitations on the property owner’s use of his land can be derived from the
constitution itself.180 Furthermore, so long as the private property owner exercises his
property rights “responsibly” (i.e. with an eye to the common good), interference by the
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state in these rights requires justification.181 There are no direct legal consequences of
14.2, though.182 Only regulation legitimized by the legislature or administrative authority
empowered by the legislature can impose binding obligations on the landowner.183
2.

The indirect obligation

The legislature, empowered to shape property rights by Art. 14.I.ii (“the contents
and limits clause”), must balance the public good against the positive guarantee, which
represents the owner’s own interests.184 This requirement to balance the competing
public and individual interests at issue is known as the Abwägungsgebot (“the duty to
weigh.”) The central question in this determination is whether or not a regulation is
verhältnismässig (proportionate) or reasonable for the property owner. The principle of
Verhältnismässigkeit (proportionality), a fundamental tool of constitutional interpretation
not mentioned explicitly in the Basic Law but well recognized in the scholarship,
requires: (1) a legitimate reason for an interference with fundamental rights, (2) an
appropriate and necessary means of interference and (3) a proportionate means-end
relationship.185 Among the factors considered by courts in this balancing test are the
social function of the relevant type of property; the meaning of the property for the
owner; the effect on third parties of use of the property; the suitability of that property use
to its site; vested interests and the investment of one’s own capital or effort in use of the
property.
The results of this balancing of the factors form the basis for distinguishing
between entschädigungslose (“noncompensable”)186 definitions of the Sozialbindung by
the legislature and ausgleichspflichtige regulations (where there is a duty to undertake an
Ausgleichsleistung, an equalization payment or measure). A regulation that is deemed
181
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non-compensable is to be accepted by the property owner as part of the social
obligation.187 In the exceptional case—where an individual or group of individuals is
disproportionately burdened in a particular case by a measure’s limitation of property
rights in the public interest—payment of compensation (though generally an amount that
is less than the full market value of the property) or non-monetary mitigating measures,
such as variances and amortization periods, are required.188 Meant to soften the impact of
a particular regulatory measure for a particular individual or group of individuals, the
equalization payment is considered to resemble private law compensation for tort
damages more than constitutional compensation for expropriation. The classic instance
of application for the Ausgleichsleistung is the hardship plaintiff and it was in this context
that the doctrine was first developed by the FCC in the 1981 Mandatory Sample decision
described above.
Despite the narrow paths available for getting compensation or mitigation, a wide
range of land-use regulations fall under the category of non-compensable social
obligation. For instance, the reallocation of plots, both developed and undeveloped,
within the area of a binding land-use plan for the purpose of reordering or opening up
specific new areas for development is not considered a taking, but rather within the
legislature’s competence to define property rights. Although this zoning tool (known as
Baulandumlegung)189 may require property owners to bear interference in ownership
rights for the good of others, the court reasoned that because the purpose of this provision
of the Federal Building Code was primarily to reconcile the private interests of property
owners with one another and only secondarily to further a public interest (in orderly
development190), this was non-compensable. Furthermore, the reallocation does not deny
core rights to plaintiffs, but rather facilitates, above all, owners’ own use of property for
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development, and therefore fulfills the purpose of constitutional property protection
rather than denying core rights to the plaintiffs, the FCC reasoned.191
Also to be tolerated by landowners, without compensation, as a part of the social
obligation are the extensive regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, including rent
freezes and very limited eviction rights for landlords192; obligations to use193, maintain
and rehabilitate historic buildings194; development freezes195 of up to four years when
municipalities are changing a land use plan196; a general right of first refusal for local
governments (Allgemeines Vorkaufsrecht of the Gemeinden) to purchase land put up for
sale by an owner;197 and the right of the legislature to redefine land ownership so as to
exclude groundwater198 and mineral resources.199
3.

Social function or relevance of property
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In defining and redefining property rights the legislature must consider the
function of constitutional property protection.200 The more closely that a certain type of
property may be tied to the personhood or personal autonomy of its owner, the greater the
protection recognized by courts and the less discretion left to the legislature to limit those
ownership rights.201 Courts have distinguished different types of property from one
another based on a hierarchy of uses that takes into account a type of property’s
importance for the general public or affected third parties.202 Owners of property in land,
for example, have a heightened social obligation because of its finite supply.203 Thus, the
court may consider the interests of non-owners and the general public to a greater extent
than in the case of types of property without any special relevance. In another example,
the legislature may take greater liberties in restricting the property rights of public
housing owners204 than owners of private housing because subsidized housing has a
special relevance for a socially just system of land ownership.205 The high social
importance of publicly subsidized housing and the vulnerability of its occupants within
the economic sphere and in shaping their own lives justify expansive regulation by the
legislature.206
Courts have also held that there is a hierarchy among various public interests in
land use regulation. The protection of natural resources achieved by requiring property
owners to remove water or ground pollution, for example, generally corresponds to a
greater social responsibility than the promotion of cultural life that is a goal of historic
preservation.207 And despite the high priority placed on protection of natural
resources,208 certain justifications for protection have more weight than others. Purely
aesthetic reasons for conservation are given less weight than ecological considerations,
200
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for example.209 Yet, owners of historically or culturally significant buildings are subject
to a higher social obligation than owners of buildings not protected by historic
preservation legislation, which are deemed less significant. And even among owners of
protected buildings, courts have held that the social obligation to maintain and preserve
weighs heavier against the private owner’s interest in the case of some buildings than
others, depending on the buildings’ historical or cultural significance.
4.

Change of Conditions

The FCC has emphasized repeatedly that the definition of property is dynamic.
“The contents and functions of property are capable and in need of adaptation to social
and economic conditions. It is the task of the legislature to undertake such adaptation
while taking into account the fundamental constitutional values.”210 In other words, the
legislature may constantly redefine the protectable sphere of constitutional property to
correspond to developments in German society, so long as the other principles of
constitutional interpretation, such as proportionality, equality and, most important, the
positive guarantee, are observed.
The “Small Garden Plot” (Kleingarten) decision211 illustrates the willingness of
German courts to respond to developments in German society by adjusting the definition
of protected property. In this case, the FCC invalidated a federal statute that had made it
virtually impossible for private lessors of small garden plots to cancel their leases.
Although it had been common at one time for large landowners to lease land for growing
vegetables to city dwellers, this use had been increasingly supplanted by large-scale
commercial agricultural production and the plots were now held mainly for recreational
uses. The Court reasoned that such a limitation of property rights was no longer required
by the social obligation and, therefore, no longer justified by 14.2. The burden on
property owners (the lessors) was, therefore, held excessive in relation to the purpose
served by the legislation and unconstitutional, according to the Court.
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The FCC also relied on the doctrine of changed conditions in reviewing the
validity of a 1971 federal law introduced, in the face of a housing shortage, to provide
additional protection for lessees of residential property in the
Wohnraumkündigungsschutzgesetz (Eviction Protection Law) case.212 This law imposed
a blanket prohibition on eviction and only allowed lessors to raise the rent, with the
permission of the lessee, to the level of what was normal for similarly-situated
properties.213 In finding the provision to be a proportionate exercise of the legislature’s
14.1.2 powers and a fair burden for the lessor, the Court emphasized the dire housing
shortage of the time.
In a more recent case,214 the FSC examined the constitutionality of a special
statute215 that prohibited landlords from canceling residential leases, even in the case of a
“justifiable interest” (berechtiges Interesse)216 (a circumstance that had, under the
German Civil Code, released owners from lease obligations). Passed right after German
re-unification, the legislation aimed to achieve stability in the real estate market by
preventing too much property from changing hands during this period. The plaintiff
property owner had received a grant from the city redevelopment agency to demolish his
building in light of the 38 percent drop in population and associated apartment surplus in
the East German city where the case was filed. However, one holdout tenant refused to
leave, citing this statute. In striking down the law, the court held that recent demographic
trends and related developments in the housing market no longer justified the policy
rationale behind the legislation and therefore this measure as a reasonable social
obligation.
5.

Meaning for the property owner and third parties

The meaning of the relevant property for the particular owner is another key
element in the balancing test used by courts to assess the proportionality of government
regulation. Not surprisingly, German courts have most explicitly applied this subjective
analysis in cases about one’s home or residence, closely scrutinizing laws that regulate
212
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rental property. Given the importance of the home to most individuals, the FCC has not
only granted strong protection to the personhood interests of legal owners but also
recognized tenants’ ownership rights.217 The FCC has observed that occupants, like
owners, of residential property are dependent on and develop personhood interests in
their homes, even if they are rented.218 Since this attachment resembles the type of
relationship accorded most protection under Article 14, the Court has concluded that
lessees may be considered to have separate property interests in the occupied space.219
Even before the FCC explicitly recognized ownership rights in tenancy, the Court
often considered the impacts of legislatively-determined property rights on nonowners.220 For instance, a 1985 case221 upheld a section of the Civil Code making a
landlord’s right to cancel a lease contingent on a justifiable interest.222 Because “[l]arge
parts of the population cannot, for financial reasons, acquire or set up their own homes
and are, therefore, in an existential way dependent on the use of foreign property,” facing
considerable personal, familial, economic and social costs if the right to use that property
is lost, the Court reasoned that it was proportionate to make a landlord’s right to cancel a
tenant’s lease dependent on a justifiable interest.223
The FCC here affirmed a lower court judgment that a plaintiff wanting to move
into a seven-room apartment that she owned did not have a justifiable interest based on
Eigenbedarf because her interest in moving from a three-room apartment to a larger
living space was not important enough to justify displacing the tenant already there.224
Agreeing with the lower court that “the need portrayed [was], from an objective
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perspective, excessive or exaggerated,”225 the FCC concluded that this was an exercise of
property rights that, in light of the social meaning of the home, is not constitutionally
protected.226 On the other hand, in the case described above in which the FCC struck
down the law imposing extraordinary restrictions on lessors in the aftermath of
reunification, the court took special note of the fact that the only remaining tenants in the
building sought to be demolished had another apartment in a nearby town and were,
therefore, not dependent “in an existential way” on this home.227
The legislature must always consider the living needs or requirements
(Wohnbedarf) of the property owner, though, the FCC has emphasized.228 In recognizing
that the home is also important to the landlord—“the center of his existence”229—the
court has concluded that Eigenbedarf must be subjectively interpreted. For example, the
same court that held that the interest of the plaintiff above in moving to a larger
apartment that she owned did not constitute Eigenbedarf held that the lower court had
failed to recognize the justifiable interests of an 89-year-old plaintiff in reclaiming a
ground-floor apartment that she owned from the existing tenants. The plaintiff argued
that she had difficulties climbing the steps up to her present apartment and wanted to be
closer to her daughter, who lived in the same building as the ground-floor apartment she
wanted to use. Although the plaintiff was living at the time in an apartment that was,
from the perspective of the Court, suitable in all other ways, the FCC was nevertheless
concerned that by not allowing the plaintiff to move to the more accessible apartment
near her daughter, she had been “considerably restricted in her freedom to lead her life . .
. in the way she considers right.”230 In other words, the Court found the plaintiff’s
reasons to be legitimate because they touched upon the core purpose of property
protection. In contrast, the ownership rights of the other owner above were not accorded
such a great degree of protection by the court because her specific relationship to the
property did not implicate the autonomy-securing purpose of property protection to the
same extent.
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One case in which, under the Civil Code, even a justified interest is not required
for cancellation of a lease is when the landlord lives in such close proximity to a tenant
that her own residential and living space is directly affected by the tenant’s use of that
property. In other words, when the landlord’s own sphere of autonomy is directly
implicated, her interest in canceling the contract is considered as important as the tenant’s
interest in remaining.231

6.

Situationally-based factors (Situationsgebundenheit)

The weight of the regulatory burden on an owner also corresponds to the physical
setting and characteristics of the property itself. Distinct from the Sozialbindung, which
refers to the way in which property interests are determined by the general social function
of a type of property, the principle of Situationsgebundenheit governs the legislature’s
determination of the contents and limits of property rights on the basis of physical context
and situation. Since the German constitution conceptualizes its citizens as persons living
within and dependent upon society, the FSC has reasoned that an owner’s rights and
duties change over time, as the environmental context of her property changes.232 As the
principle was later formulated by the Federal Administrative Court, the 14.2 direct social
obligation on the property owner limits the positive constitutional guarantee to those uses
of property that the owner can reasonably expect to continue. This cannot be the case if
the owner should have foreseen that the natural characteristics or probable development
of the surrounding area would make a use unreasonable.233
As the FSC reasoned in the Grünflächen (Green Space) decision,234 an owner is
presumed to know, based on the location of her property, that she cannot use that
property in certain ways. In that case, the rezoning of land long used for agriculture to
open space in a densely developed industrial area was upheld, even though the
designation prevented any further development. The city justified the building
prohibition as necessary in light of the high population density that had developed since
231
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the plot was zoned agricultural. This development made the interest of the regional
public in health and outdoor recreation especially compelling. In another case, an owner
of a plot in the vicinity of a historic chapel was denied a building permit to construct a
shed on his property, even though it was zoned for such a structure, because of its
proximity to the landmark.235 In another case, a farm owner who had planted old beech
and oak trees on his land (in order to sell them as timber) long before they were
designated as protected natural resources,236 was prohibited from felling those trees.237
As the FSC has held, property is bound by its situation (seiner Natur nach)—its
geography, surroundings and natural features—with a certain commitment (Pflichtigkeit)
that can always, upon the legislature’s exercise of its 14.1.2 competence, intensify to a
“duty” (Pflicht).238 As the FSC reasoned in the Gravel Mining case, the property owner
was refused a permission to extract gravel because, among other reasons, the area to be
developed was a small forest that served as habitat for various animals and that was seen
as vital for future regeneration of the area. “[A] rational and reasonable owner, who had
not lost sight of the common good, would abstain from gravel extraction…. He would not
close his mind to the knowledge that the completely paramount interest of landscape
protection requires retention of the remaining forest and compels him to refrain from the
otherwise economically rational exploitation of the gravel deposit which lies in his
private interests.”239
Although the direct social obligation on owners (derived from 14.2 of the
Grundgesetz) may apply in some cases where a once reasonable use no longer
corresponds to the current situation, there is a presumption in favor of an alreadyexercised use that alters the physical state of the property. Such investment of labor or
capital by the owner is thought to demonstrate a certain Situationsberechtigung
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(situationally-bound entitlement).240 That is, an already-made use enjoying
Bestandschutz might suggest that this use is appropriate to the property’s location or
situational characteristics and is even thought to change the “situation” of the property.241
Thus, the Federal Administrative Court in the Bayerisches Naturschutzgesetz (“Bavarian
Nature Protection Law”) case,242 upholding as a noncompensable content regulation an
administrative action that declared the plaintiff’s shoreline property a nature preserve and
prohibited recreational uses, including camping, swimming, rowing, and sailing (and only
allowed the owner to make agricultural use of his property as a hay meadow that could be
harvested once annually), justified its decision partly by the fact that recreational uses had
never been made, which it found hardly surprising given the unsuitability of recreational
uses to the plot.

B.

U.S. Comparison
1.

Social Relevance

There is general consensus among courts and legal scholars that our nuisanceinfluenced takings doctrine reflects an unstated social obligation that takes into account
the social function and relevance of different types of property. However, it remains
unsettled how much further this obligation extends than the duty not to do harm—that is,
how broadly “harm” is to be interpreted and whether the duty can be construed as an
affirmative obligation of property owners to preserve or protect natural or cultural
resources for the general public, for example, or whether courts consider the subjective
effects of one’s property use on a larger class of non-property owners in upholding
regulation.
The California Supreme Court decision Ehrlich v. City of Culver City243 presents
a typical borderline case in defining the scope of an owner’s social obligation. Ehrlich
240

Article 14 protects the property owner who, in reliance upon his property rights has increased the value of his
property, from the sudden devaluation of his property by a change to the legal order. The requirements for this
protection, the court has said, is that the property has “set something in motion” (“etwas ins Werk gesetzt hat”), which
means that she has contributed labor or capital to value-creating changes. BVerfGE 58, 300 (349).
241
BGHZ 105, 15, 20.
242
BVerwGE 94, 1. The law challenged in this case is the Bayerisches Naturschutzgesetz (Abs. 36 abs. 2).
243
12 Cal. 4th 854 (1996).

48

involved a challenge by the owner of land that had once been the site of a private health
and recreation center244 to the city’s imposition of both a $280,000 “mitigation fee’ and
an exaction under the city’s “art in public places” program as conditions for approval of
his request that the property be rezoned to permit construction of a condominium project.
The trial and appellate courts saw the situation very differently. While the trial court
concluded that the exaction was “simply an effort to shift the cost of providing a public
benefit to one no more responsible for the need than any other taxpayer,”245 the Court of
Appeals held that the “mitigation fee was imposed to compensate the City for the benefit
conferred on the developer by the City’s approval of the town home project and for the
burden to the community resulting from the loss of recreational facilities.”246 After the
Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s judgment for reconsideration in light of
Dolan,247 the state supreme court found the connection between the negative effects that
the city could mitigating using its police power and the required dedication insufficient—
the record did not support the required “fit” between the monetary exaction and the loss
of the parcel zoned for commercial recreational use.248 Although the court acknowledged
that the withdrawal of this private land use had adverse public impacts,249 the court
carefully distinguished between the value of a recreational use on that parcel and the
value of plaintiff’s health club. “[T]he loss which the city seeks to mitigate by levying
the contested recreational fee is not the loss of any particular recreational facility, but the
loss of property reserved for private recreational use.”250 That is, the plaintiff could not
be made to pay for the loss of the actual facility that he was providing to the community,
but rather only for the right not to use his parcel for the use for which it was zoned—that
is, for the costs involved in rezoning.
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Although U.S. courts no longer seem to link many forms of social obligation to a
harm or noxious-use principle,251 courts still struggle with the question of which property
uses or public purposes must yield to competing land uses. Ehrlich is doctrinally about
exactions (and, therefore triggers the Supreme Court’s means-end analysis from Nollan
and Dolan), but there is still a question lurking in this case about whether the plaintiff
caused a “harm” by refraining from a beneficial use that he had previous engaged in, or
why his desired future use must be tied to the provision of a public benefit for the
community.
Indeed, there are no shortage of articles describing the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence as a “muddle”252 and puzzling over the source and scope of this obligation.
Andrea Peterson proposes one model for understanding the outcomes of Supreme Court
regulatory takings cases that in some ways resembles the German doctrines for
circumscribing the Sozialpflicht. By asking “whether the lawmakers reasonably believed
that the people of their jurisdiction would consider A’ s conduct to be wrongful,” the
reviewing court is referring to societal judgments of wrongdoing, she suggests.253 In
Mugler v. Kansas, for instance, the Supreme Court refused to find a taking despite
serious economic loss to the plaintiff, a brewery owner, where the State of Kansas
prohibited the manufacture of alcoholic beverages, a measure that allegedly “represented
the moral judgment of the people of Kansas at that time.”254 Peterson does not propose
“how judgments of wrongdoing are made,” but her thesis depends “on the assumption
that people in our society constantly make judgments as to who is in the wrong in
conflicts regarding economically valuable resources” and that “the results reached by the
Court in its taking decisions are generally consistent with these societal judgments of
wrongdoing.”255
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Peterson is, therefore, not necessarily convinced by Scalia’s argument that harm is
in the “eyes of the beholder” or by Joseph Sax’s assertion that “neither takings cases nor
nuisance law can be viewed as depending on judgments of blame or wrongdoing” since
these cases usually involve “two conflicting land uses, neither of them in the wrong.”256
The problem with this “Coasean mode of analysis,” she argues, is that it is inconsistent
with “ordinary perceptions of the world.” In the case of fire regulations imposed upon
old wooden buildings in a city, for example, the question of whether “the house owner
caused the harm by operating a fire trap” or the building has become a fire trap “because
others have made the neighborhood a congested one” is not as difficult as Scalia or Sax
would suggest. Although this might be a difficult case “from a Coasean point of view,”
Peterson argues that the Court would have no problem concluding the regulation did not
effect a taking, given “widely shared judgments of wrongdoing”—people “generally
regard a building that is a ‘firetrap’ as creating an undue risk of harm to others.”257
Thus, Peterson’s account of the Supreme Court’s takings cases posits a contextual
inquiry by the Court that resembles the German courts’ dynamic notion of property. In
her model judgments of wrongdoing may change over time and vary geographically, and,
therefore, what constitutes a taking also varies over time. “The moral justification
principle takes this factor into account by focusing on whether the lawmakers reasonably
believed the conduct at issue would be regarded as blameworthy by the people of that
jurisdiction at that time.”258 For instance, laws that once prohibited the manufacture or
sale of alcohol no longer correspond to what lawmakers in most jurisdictions believe. On
the other hand, a law that prohibited the owner of an historically significant building from
destroying its exterior may once have been disfavored whereas today it seems more likely
“that lawmakers in many localities could reasonably believe that their constituents would
consider it wrong to destroy the exterior of an historically significant building.”259 In
that jurisdiction consider such conduct to be immoral, wholly apart from any judgment that such conduct causes harm
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reasoning reminiscent of the German doctrine of Situationsgebundenheit, Peterson also
describes the case in which a given type of conduct is considered wrongful only in a
particular location or under certain circumstances. “For example, a factory in a
residential neighborhood may be viewed as a nuisance, although it would be readily
acceptable in an industrial neighborhood. The judgment is merely that it is wrong to act
in this manner in this particular location.”260
Even Peterson’s theory does not locate an affirmative obligation in property
ownership under Supreme Court jurisprudence. Her theory would not, for instance,
explain the German cases that require property owners to preserve their land as open
space261 or to expend resources to maintain historically significant structures.262 It does
not assert an expansive social obligation justified, as it is in Germany, by nothing more
than one’s general obligation as a citizen to consider one’s relationship to the social order
and community in exercising one’s rights. Without the fulcrum notion of the positive
guarantee—and what that is meant to protect (dignity and autonomy)—one’s default
position as a property owner under U.S. law is not limited, as it is in Germany, to some
notion of a reasonable profit. Rather, one is entitled to exploit one’s property, even under
Peterson’s theory, until the point that one’s community disapproves.
2.

Meaning of property to the owner

In contrast to Germany, the relative political and economic power of the injured
landowner—and, therefore, the subjective meaning of property for that owner—is not
taken into consideration under U.S. law, at least partly because “our entrenched
understanding of judicial discourse regards any consideration of these issues in deciding
specific cases as crude and inappropriate.”263 Although Hanoch Dagan argues that Hodel

A sense that the fate of some objects is momentous for the community at large has certainly insinuated itself into the
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v. Irving264—in which the Supreme Court struck down a section of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act that provided for undivided fractional interests in certain small
allotments of land265 to revert to the tribe upon the death of the interest owner—
represents “an extreme example of cases where the plaintiff’s political and economic
power is so low that our egalitarian commitments may well require the use of a sideconstraint,”266 Dagan’s interpretation has not been widely adopted. Even though “the
same regulation can have different constitutional significance as applied to different
claimants,”267 there are few regulatory takings cases in which the Court considers the
subjective meaning of property to its owners, and the Court rarely—if at all—up- or
downgrades its estimation of a regulatory burden on the basis of the property owner’s
economic means or the significance of the property to the owner.268
IX.

Limits on the Sozialpflicht

“Ownership might obligate, but not so far as to give it up,” states a prominent
treatise on the Grundgesetz.269 Indeed, an Article 14 claim often focuses on locating the
Schranken-Schranke (“limitation limit”), which refers to the limit on the legislature’s
14.1.2 discretion to determine the limits (Schranken) of property rights. “The common
good is not only the justification, but also the limit for infringements on property rights,”
according to the FCC.270 In other words, property rights may be limited in the name of
the Sozialpflicht but only so far as is justifiable to further the public interest. The
structure of Article 14 reflects the conceptual tension between the justification for and the
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limitation on property regulation.271 The same clause that empowers the legislature to
define property as an exercise of the Sozialbindung limits this authority by
unconstitutionally guaranteeing protection of certain core property rights, regardless of
the justification for limiting them.
Finding the constitutional border for the content and limit-defining legislature—the
absolute and essential core of the fundamental property right and the property guarantee
(the Kernbereich)—therefore, involves two central inquiries: 1) what the Bestand or
“condition”272 of an owner’s property entitlements are and 2) what part of that protection
may not be infringed by the Sozialbindung.273 In determining what a property owner may
rely on as her protected “condition” of rights, courts look at how the owner has used the
property until the point of regulation. Her rights are more likely to be considered
positively guaranteed (and therefore off limits for legislating away) if her use of the
property meets the fundamental purposes of property protection; if she has invested labor
and/or capital in using her property and if her expectations for continued use are
reasonable (i.e. socially responsible for the greater community). Thus, in circumscribing
the essential core (the Kernbereich) of ownership rights, these three categories—(1)
Sicherungseigentum (those objects required to maintain a subsistence level), (2)
Leistungseigentum (property acquired by an owner as a result of his or her own efforts,
including both monetary contribution and labor) and (3) Vertrauenseigentum (a legal
position that a reasonable owner would rely upon)—enjoy the greatest protection. The
FCC considers both subjective elements (the uses that must remain for the individual
owner) and objective elements (the essential uses that must remain for a legal position to
still “deserve”274 the name “property”) of the Kernbereich.275
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A.

Vested property rights

The property guarantee does not cover mere expectation of future earnings or
profit that an owner expects to acquire based on nothing more than an existing favorable
situation (such as lack of pre-existing regulation or a general zoning designation of one’s
parcel before a building permit has been applied for).276 Only what has already been
acquired or achieved through the investment of one’s own work (eigene Leistung) or
capital (considered the equivalent of eigene Leistung)—what has been “ins Werk gesetzt”
(set in motion)—is constitutionally protected.277 Thus, because the property owner in the
Bavarian Nature Protection Law described above had nothing “in the works,”278 he was
not considered to have any vested rights or entitlement to build on his property at the
point that regulation was imposed. Based on the general constitutional principle of
Vertrauensschutz (protection of valuable expectations), Article 14 protects the owner
who has created value on her land, in reasonable reliance on a certain legal situation,
from the sudden devaluation of her property by a change in the law.279
The Planungswertausgleich, a planning tool for recouping from owners part of
the increase in property values created by government-funded improvements in
redevelopment districts (Sanierungsgebieten), illustrates the principle of vested rights in
its most extreme version.280 The rationale for requiring a property owner to surrender
some of her profits is that land-use regulation, rather than one’s own efforts, are
responsible for the increase in value of the property.281 As one commentator explains, “If
the law compensates an owner for the loss of a right, should he not be obliged to also
compensate the public for benefits which have accrued to him directly and only from the
enactment of a zoning ordinance… If the enactment of an ordinance raises the market
276
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value 100 percent from one day to the next, then the ‘elimination of the planning profit’
could limit those benefits arising not from individual efforts, but from the public concept
of city planning.”282 Although there were proposals in the German parliament in the
1970s to enact legislation requiring such reimbursement in a broad range of
circumstances, this planning measure remains limited to the specific case of
redevelopment districts rather than to all zoning measures that might increase the value of
an owner’s property. Nevertheless, the Planungswertausgleich illustrates the importance
of an owner’s own investment in a property use for determining when that right has
vested, as well as the more general willingness of the courts and legislature to temper
profits that are not considered vested.
B.

The Special Case of Development Rights (Baufreiheit)

Under German law, an owner is not necessarily entitled to any use, unless it has
made concrete by the legislature performing its 14.1.2 function to formulate positive law
and, therefore, protected by Bestandschutz.283 Nevertheless, the majority opinion among
scholars is that Baufreiheit (“freedom to build” or, more accurately, freedom to build
within the law284) is part of one’s inherent right to use one’s property.285 Practically
speaking, this freedom is probably academic, though—the elimination of uses that have
not been explicitly permitted by the government (in the form of a building permit) are not
compensable286 and there are no inherent building uses so strongly suggested by the
nature or situation of property that they can extend further than the positive protection
legislated under 14.1.2, according to the FCC.287 (The notion of the Kernbereich, of
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course, represents a constitutional entitlement to some use of property, though it may be
one that does not involve building.)
Thus, Baufreiheit really only means that that the right of an owner to build must
be weighed against the common good and does not prevent substantial regulation of
development.288 The results of such a weighing of interests may even be that no building
is allowed on a certain plot. In the chapel case mentioned above, for instance, preserving
the landscape around an already-existing historic structure was accorded greater weight
than the individual owner’s Baufreiheit.289 Environmental protection also regularly
supersedes the freedom to build.290
The question of development use is also unsettled under U.S. law, as suggested by
the dialogue between the Nollan majority and Brennan’s dissent in that case.291 Although
the Nollan plaintiffs purchased property after the passage of legislation requiring
provision of public access in new development projects, the Supreme Court nevertheless
held that conditioning the right to build on provision of this access would constitute a
taking. Though Brennan referred to a development permit as a “benefit” in his Nollan
opinion, the majority rejected this reasoning, holding that the “right to build on one’s own
property—even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
requirements—cannot remotely be described as a ‘government benefit.’”292 Taken from
the Nollan plaintiffs, under this conception, was the right to pursue economic value by
building on their lot without providing public access. Although the property owners had
never acquired the right to build without providing this public access under state law, the
court clearly considered this their “property.”293
C.

Kernbereich and Privatnützigkeit

Distinct from the notion of vested rights is the Kernbereich (“core area”). Certain
essential rights, analogous to the Anglo-Saxon conception of sticks in a bundle, are
considered inviolable and protected regardless of pre-existing use or reliance—namely,
288
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dominion or disposition over property (Verfügungsbefugnis) and an owner’s private use
of the object (Privatnützigkeit). The theory behind the Kernbereich is that, at some point,
regulation can become so burdensome on one or both of those rights that the core of
property ownership is infringed, and the property guarantee compromised. At this point,
a regulation becomes unconstitutional. Any inquiry into the proportionality or general
constitutionality of a regulatory or legislative property-defining measure must, therefore,
be guided by the essential question of what uses remain in the hands of the owner.294 In
fact, defining or even recognizing the point at which Kernbereich uses have been
eliminated is the central concern of contemporary constitutional property jurisprudence.
The loss of Verfügungsbefugnis has been relatively easy for courts to identify.
Land-use regulation that depresses the value of property to such a great extent that it
becomes impossible for owners to sell or transfer land in fee simple has been treated as
equivalent to the loss of Handlungsfreiheit, the right to transfer property, and, therefore,
considered an unconstitutional infringement of an owner’s disposition over property.
Courts have had a more difficult time determining when Privatnützigkeit has been
lost, however. In defining private use as “the assignment of a property object to a rights
bearer, who will use it as the basis of private initiative,” the FCC protects private
autonomy in the economic sphere insofar as such autonomy is critical to realizing the
purpose of property protection for the capitalist “social order” and for the individual
owner.295 Thus, courts have identified two elements of Privatnützigkeit: 1) the abstract
and inherent utility of an object (uses that are objectively reasonable and socially just,
based on the property’s natural situation and social function) and 2) the freedom of the
particular property owner to choose among possible uses (the actual uses available to the
owner based on the current legal order and her relationship to the object of protection).
While the first element requires courts to gauge societal consensus, the second involves a
subjective analysis of the purpose served by ownership for the individual and of what has
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been described by one scholar as the “freedom potential,” or the financial basis left to the
owner for self-governance and autonomy.296
In the Bavarian Nature Protection Law case described above the Court
determined, after examining both prongs of private use, that the Kernbereich had not
been infringed. In addition to the fact that the plot did not objectively suggest or seem
suitable for recreational uses and that the property owner had not exercised such a use
before or acquired the land for this purpose, the Court’s opinion emphasizes that he could
still use the land for agriculture or forestry, apply for a variance, as well as sell or lease
the parcel. The owner, in other words, still had private use of his property
(Privatnützigkeit) because he could derive some utility from it, even if it was not a use
particularly profitable to him.
However, even if a property owner must accept, as part of her non-compensable
social obligation, that she will be denied the most profitable use of her property,297
owners may not be compelled to use property at a loss. Under the private use
requirement, the owner must be able to realize some profit on her property.298 Thus,
although courts have sanctioned regulations obligating owners to bear the cost for
preservation or maintenance of historically or culturally significant property, it is
generally considered unreasonable for owners of protected buildings to dip into personal
savings (rather than the profits of property use) to fulfill the preservation obligation.299 In
a recent case before the FCC, the Court found that an industrial concern denied the right
to tear down a historic villa under an architectural preservation statute had been denied
private use of its property. Despite maintenance costs of 300,000 DM per year as well as
another 1,000,000 DM for legislatively mandated renovations, the villa had been empty
since 1981 and the owner could find neither buyer nor lessee.” Since transfer of the villa
had become impossible, the Court concluded that the company had lost the right of
disposition. With no other reasonable private use for the property, the owner was forced
to bear a burden “without being able to enjoy in exchange any of the advantages of
private use.” That is, the social obligation to preserve and restore the structure had
296
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become more expensive than its value to the owner, now in a “situation that does not
deserve the name ‘property’ anymore,” held the Court.300
Thus, in summary, differentiating a non-compensable (entschädigungsfrei-) from
a compensable (ausgleichspflichtigen) social obligation is based on the private use
remaining despite regulation.301 This distinction, as illustrated in the discussion above on
ownership rights of tenants, is at least partially subjective. The Court examines the uses
left to a particular property owner, in light of property’s personhood-developing purpose
for that owner.302 Whether economically reasonable uses remain to the owner is
determined with regard to property’s social function and relevance to non-owners, as well
as its situationally-bound limitations.303
In contrast, post-regulation uses remaining to the owner are not the central inquiry
of U.S. takings jurisprudence. Instead, the Supreme Court seems to focus on the absolute
impact of a land-use regulation—that is, on what was taken rather than what was left
over.304 Furthermore, “the existence of economic injury is indispensable to
demonstrating a regulatory taking,” as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held.305 Although the Court still struggles to find the threshold beyond which regulation
is unreasonable, the Lucas decision—which presents an extreme version of regulatory
burden, the total wipe-out—is illustrative of the Court’s approach to determining impact
of regulation.
In Lucas, the plaintiff real estate developer brought a successful takings claim on
the basis of his intention to build homes similar to those on adjacent seafront parcels. No
law prohibited him from building on the land at the time of purchase, but two years later
300
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the state legislature passed an act barring Lucas and similarly-situated owners from
erecting any permanent habitable structures on their lots in order to, among other
purposes, prevent erosion of the state’s beach system.306 Although the Supreme Court
viewed this as a 100 percent deprivation of economically viable use of the plaintiff’s
land,307 the argument may be made that Lucas did not sustain a total deprivation because
a total deprivation would have meant that the owner was denied the rights to occupy, use,
exclude and transfer his property. As Justice Blackmun points out in his dissent,308 the
property owner could still “picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a
movable trailer,” as well as probably sell the property to neighbors, nearby residents or
speculators.309 However, he had lost his investment-backed expectation to be able to
build on each lot, the majority held. While the holding does not suggest that the owner is
entitled to extract the maximum profit from her property,310 the decision does illustrate
the emphasis on the economic injury to plaintiff in regulatory takings cases.
D.

What property is not: Bestand not Wertgarantie

In contrast to the U.S., German constitutional property doctrine has developed
around the guarantee of a personal right. Neither every possible or economically
reasonable use311 nor the chance to exploit every economically valuable use312 is
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protected. In general, worth is guaranteed only to the extent that it is necessary to secure
freedom and autonomy in an economic sphere.
In order to distinguish freedom- and autonomy-securing uses of property from the
mere protection of economic worth, the German courts consider the subjective meaning
of already-existing property rights (the “condition” or Bestand) for an owner. A recent
FCC decision about the responsibility of a property owner to restore the contaminated
soil on his plot to its natural condition, regardless of whether he caused the damage or
even knew about it upon purchase, illustrates this analysis. In this case, the FCC reexamined the Court’s general guideline that a regulation is no longer proportionate if the
owner’s costs in meeting her social obligation surpass the property’s market value
(because this would represent the effective loss of the right to transfer). However, this is
not an absolute rule, the Court held, because the value that may be recovered on the
market is not always an accurate gauge of the owner’s relationship to the property. Fair
market value does not necessarily reflect what the owner herself has actually invested in
the property. Factors that cannot be attributed to the plaintiff, such as changes in
planning law or in the worth of neighboring properties, may affect the overall value.
Further, the owner may derive certain subjective benefits from the property that make it
more valuable to her than to the market.313 Courts should engage in this type of
individualized analysis in determining the threshold of reasonable social obligation, the
Court held, because if the property constitutes a significant portion of the owner’s net
worth and “therefore serves as the foundation of her private life and that of her family,”
the social obligation might be adjusted downwards.314
The scheme of remedies available to property owners for takings or
disproportionate limitations of property rights also reflects the priority of the
Bestandsgarantie (guarantee of one’s existing “condition” of property rights) before the
Wertgarantie (guarantee of the worth of property). As the FCC has said on a number of
occasions, there is generally no inverse condemnation action for regulation. Property
owners, in other words, may not “tolerate and liquidate” by demanding money for an
excessive limitation of property rights that has been suffered if the statute under which
312
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the regulation was carried out does not provide for the equalization payments described
above. The property owner may attack a regulatory action as an unconstitutional
infringement of her property in the form of a facial challenge to a regulation or statute
and obtain an injunctive remedy, but an unconstitutional definition of property by the
legislature under 14.1.2 cannot be reinterpreted as an expropriation and cured by granting
compensation, as it may be under U.S. law. Even if legislation provides for
compensation to disproportionately burdened landowners, Court has also stated on
multiple occasions that Ausgleichsleistungen (equalization measures) may not be limited
to money and that non-monetary compensation is in fact preferable, insofar as it secures
property in the hands of the owner.
X.

Conclusion
Private property plays a similar role in Germany and the United States. In both

countries, legal recognition and protection of property rights represent a surrogate or
symbol for freedom, actual and potential. Thus, at the core of both schemes of
constitutional property protection is a strong neoclassical conception of shielding the
state’s overreaching into one’s personal sphere. However, alongside that in Germany, at
both the doctrinal level and as an essential ingredient of constitutional culture, is a
rigorous and widely accepted notion of social obligations of property use. In contrast,
courts in the U.S. have long faced vigorous resistance from both property owners as well
as their legal and political advocates to duties imposed on landowners by the State in
furtherance of the public interest. Yet, despite the highly abstract and lofty rhetoric of
German constitutional property decisions that proclaim a strong social obligation and
little protection for excessive wealth, one might argue that the results of challenges to
land-use regulation do not come out that differently in the two countries’ courts and that
popular understanding of property rights in the U.S. seem to underestimate the
obligations that have become solid legal precedent.315
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However, a survey of regulatory takings decisions in the two countries
demonstrates that there are several important differences between the two that,
collectively, reflect a greater protection for economic value absent personhood interests
in the U.S. First of all, in Germany there is broad consensus among courts that the
purpose of property protection is both to preserve a market-based economy as well as to
secure the autonomy and dignity of its participants, and that protecting the former is not a
substitute or proxy for the latter. Second, the clear statement of the purpose of property
protection found in all Article 14 decisions forms the basis for the concept of the
Kernbereich, the core of rights that are absolutely protected by the constitution’s positive
property guarantee. Moreover, this Kernbereich is different for every owner. The court’s
analysis is individualized, not only insofar as the reasonableness and vestedness of uses
are concerned, but also to the extent that the Court determines whether the owner’s use of
and relationship to her property match the purposes for which property is protected.
Finally, anything that is not within this Kernbereich may be sacrificed to other owners for
the good of society.316 This means that the scope of the Sozialpflicht is measured by the
Kernbereich, which is in turn tied to a purpose of property protection that is both personal
and economic.
In the U.S., on the other hand, scholars and courts alike have been unable to settle
on a core of property rights or a threshold beyond which exercises of the police power are
unreasonable, and perhaps related is the fact that there is almost no judicial mention of
the purpose of property protection in U.S. law. Although it is never referred to by judges
as such, there does seem to be a positive guarantee in U.S. law—one that is
predominantly a guarantee of economic value, though certain statutes317 and public use
jurisprudence (both outside the scope of this paper) suggest that legislatures and courts at
least recognize personhood interests even if they are not explicitly considered in Penn
Central’s regulatory takings analysis. Tying the reasonableness threshold to fair market
value has proved difficult for courts to administer,318 and has left lower courts confused
as to what the property clause guarantees and what it prohibits.

316

So long as such restriction is not unduly burdensome, as it was in the Obligatory Sample case.
Such as the owner occupant exception for many just-cause eviction ordinances
318
Courts have struggled to determine the appropriate geographic and temporal denominator in regulatory takings as
well as the numerator that is significant enough to constitute a taking
317
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Moreover, one important difference thus far unaddressed may be that many of the
regulations challenged in the U.S. (such as the coastal protection measure in Lucas or the
development moratorium in Tahoe) go challenged in German courts, accepted as routine
planning measures under the complex regulatory structure codified in the Baugesetzbuch.
The backdrop of the strong social state in Germany and public acceptance of general
community interconnectedness and obligation might, therefore, explain many of the
differences described here and perhaps limit the political viability of these doctrines in
U.S. courts.
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